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Abstract
This paper characterizes differentiable subgame perfect equilibria in a
continuous time intertemporal decision optimization problem with non-
constant discounting. The equilibrium equation takes two different forms,
one of which is reminescent of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion of optimal control, but with a non-local term. We give a local
existence result, and several examples in the consumption saving prob-
lem. The analysis is then applied to suggest that non constant discount
rates generate an indeterminacy of the steady state in the Ramsey growth
model. Despite its indeterminacy, the steady state level is robust to small
deviations from constant discount rates.
∗University of British Columbia, mathematics and economic departments (eke-
land@math.ubc.ca)
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1
1 Introduction
This paper adresses the problem of time inconsistency under non-constant dis-
counting. Whereas our method and result are quite general in character, we
have chosen to illustrate them in the framework of the Ramsey model of eco-
nomic growth, (1928; see for instance [6]), which has also been used as a test
case by Barro [5] and Karp [18] in their investigations of the subject.
In its typical formulation, the Ramsey model represents the decision maker
as maximizing:
max
∫ T
0
h(t)u (c (t)) dt+ h (T ) g (k (T )) (1)
dk
dt
= f (t, k (t))− c (t) , k (0) = k0 (2)
where [0, T ] is the life span of the decision maker and where the function f maps
[0, T ]× Rd onto Rd. Here, the decision maker can be interpreted either as an
individual or as a governement. In either case, c denotes the consumption of
the representative individual, u (c (t)) is the utility of current consumption, k (t)
is current capital and g(k(T )) is the utility of terminal capital. If the decision
maker is an individual, f(t, k(t)) represents capital rental interest and wages,
and if it is a government, it represents production and capital depreciation.
h : [0,∞] → R is the discount function. Here and in the sequel, it will
be assumed that it is continuously differentiable, with h (0) = 1, h (t) ≥ 0,
h′ (t) ≤ 0 and h (t) → 0 when t → ∞. The classical case, the one considered
by Ramsey and the subsequent litterature until the pionneering work of Strotz
[32], is the one when the discount rate is constant: h (t) = exp (−ρt) .
The decision maker, be it an individual or a government, faces this maxi-
mization problem at time 0, and decides on an overall solution, t→ (c¯ (t) , x¯ (t)),
valid for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . At any intermediate time t, the decision-maker, either her-
self at a later time if she is an individual, or whoever is in office if it is a
governement, will face a similar problem, namely:
max
∫ T
t
h (t− s)u (c (s)) ds+ h (T − t) g (k (T ))
dk
ds
= f (s, k (s))− c (s) , s ≥ t, k (t) = kt
where kt is the existing capital at time t. The solution to this problem will
be some s → (c˜ (s) , x˜ (s)), valid for t ≤ s ≤ T . If this is different from s →
(c¯ (s) , x¯ (s)), then the decision-maker at time t is being asked to implement a
policy which, from her point of view is suboptimal. This she will not do, unless
the decision-maker at time 0 has found a way to commit her. If this is not
the case, then the optimal policy t→ (c¯ (t) , x¯ (t)) for problem (1) (2) cannot be
implemented. This is the problem of time-inconsistency, which has been studied
by many authors: see [15] for a survey.
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It has been known for a long time that in the case where the discount rate
is constant, so that h (t) = exp (−ρt), time consistency obtains: (c˜, x˜) = (c¯, x¯),
so that the decision-maker at time 0 can count on the decision-makers at all
intermediate times to implement the decisions she has planned. The funda-
mental reason for which time consistency obtains is that preference reversals
due to the mere passage of time are precluded: with a constant discount rate,
relative preference between two prospective consumption plans is unaffected by
their distance into the future1. In other words, when the discount function is
exponential, relative preferences induced from the discounted utility model do
not change with time.
But why should the discount function be precisely exponential ? Experimen-
tal evidence from psychology challenges the main consequences to be derived
from constant discount rates: see Ainslie [2] and Frederick et al [13] for an
overview. Relative preferences do seem to change with time. In particular,
there is robust evidence of an inclination for imminent gratification even if ac-
companied by harmful delayed consequences. This suggest a discount rate which
is declining over time (see Ainslie [1] and Lowenstein and Prelec [22]). In other
words, the discount function h should be hyperbolic, that is, h′/h should be
decreasing.
In this paper, we will deal with general discount functions: they need not
be hyperbolic, but they are certainly not exponential. Then time-inconsistency
obtains. We shall also assume that the decision-maker at time 0 cannot commit
the decision-makers at later times t > 0. This means that the solution of
problem (1), (2) cannot be implemented. In other words, there is no way for
the decision-maker at time 0 to achieve what is, from her point of view, the
optimal solution of the problem, and she must turn to a second-best policy.
Defining and studying such a policy is the first aim of this paper. The path to
follow is clear. The best the decision-maker at time t can do is to guess what her
successors are planning to do, and to plan her own consumption c (t) accordingly.
In other words, we will be looking for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a certain
game.
A second idea now comes into play: we will assume that none of the decision-
makers is sufficiently powerful to influence the global outcome. This is very
similar to perfect competition, where no agent is sufficiently important to affect
prices, and it will be formalized in the same way. In his seminal paper [4],
Aumann captures that idea by considering an exchange economy where the set
of traders is the interval [0, 1]. An allocation then is a map x : [0, 1] → Rn+
1To see this, assume 0 < r < s < t < T and consider two consumption plans c(v) and c¯(v)
valid for v ≥ t. The incremental utilities (IU)for self “r” and self “s” are related by
IUr : =
∫ T
t
e
−ρ(v−r) [u (c(v)) − u (c¯(v))] dv
= e−ρ(s−r)
∫ T
t
e
−ρ(v−s) [u (c(v)) − u (c¯(v))] dv =: e−ρ(s−r)IUs
and therefore the ordinal ranking of c and c¯ does not change with the mere passage of time.
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and the total consumption of a coalition A ⊂ [0, 1] is the integral:∫
A
x (t) dt
so that individuals, and more generally coalitions with vanishing Lebesgue mea-
sure, have zero consumption, and therefore cannot influence prices. However,
a small coalition [t, t+ ε] will be able to do so, and its weight will be roughly
proportional to ε.
Similarly, we will consider that the set of decision-makers is the interval
[0, T ]. At time t, there is a decision-maker who decides what current consump-
tion c (t) shall be. As is readily seen from the equation (2), changing the value of
c at just one point in time will not affect the trajectory. However, the decision-
maker at time t is allowed to form a coalition with her immediate successors,
that is with all s ∈ [t, t+ ε], and we will derive the definition of an equilibrium
strategy by letting ε → 0. In fact, we are assuming that the decision-maker
t can commit her immediate successors (but not, as we said before, her more
distant ones), but that the commitment span is vanishingly small.
In section 2, we use that idea to derive a suitable concept of equilibrium
strategy. Given a strategy c = σ (t, k), a coalition [t, t+ ε] will be able to
perturb the discounted utility at time t by deviating unilaterally, that is, by
choosing some c (t) different from σ (t, k (t)); the perturbation will of course be
of the first order in ε. If there is no incentive for this coalition to deviate, in the
sense that this perturbation is always non-positive, and zero if and only if c (t) =
σ (t, k (t)), then σ is an ε-equilibrium, in fact a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Letting ε → 0, we derive an appropriate notion of equilibrium strategy in the
case when individual decision makers do not have market power.
In section 3, we characterize the newly defined equilibrium strategies in
terms of a value function V (t, k). This function is seen to satisfy two equivalent
equations, (IE) and (DE), the latter being very similar to the usual Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of optimal control, and reducing to (HJB) in the
case when h (t) is an exponential. However, (DE) is not a partial differential
equation: it contains a non-local term, which makes it much more difficult
to study than a straightforward partial differential equation. We have only a
local existence result, which is stated without proof. However, in section 4, we
provide explicit examples in the case when the horizon is infinite, T = ∞, and
f (t, k) takes the special form r (t) k+w (t) (capital revenue plus wage). We also
investigate the naive strategy, where each decision-maker simply forgets that he
cannot commit his successors, and plays as if she could; we show that it is not
an equilibrium strategy, unless u (c) = ln c.
In section 5, we focus on the infinite-horizon problem, with n = 1, and we
investigate whether there is some k¯ such that all paths k (t) converge to k¯ in
equilibrium. This is the question of balanced growth, which has been much
studied in the case when h (t) = exp (−ρt), and optimal control theory applies;
it is well known that in that case, we must have f ′
(
k¯
)
= r, which effectively pins
down the value of k¯. In the case of general discount function, we find that f ′
(
k¯
)
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must belong to some interval, and that, ceteris paribus, this interval converges
to the point r if h (t) converges to exp (−ρt). We conclude in section 6.
The results obtained in sections 5 and 6 are very similar to those obtained
earlier by Barro [5] and by Karp [18]. The main contribution of the present
paper lies elsewhere, in the precise definition of equilibrium strategies, and in
their characterization through a value function V (t, k) which has to satisfy
certain equations, reminescent of the (HJB) equation. This allows us to carry
the calculations somewhat further than Barro or Karp, and it also opens the
door to a systematic study of the problem. The local existence result which
we give is an example of what can be obtained through our approach, and not
otherwise.
The case when time is discrete, t1 = 0, t2, ..., tn−1, tn = T , has been investi-
gated by many authors, for instance Strotz [32] , Pollak [29], Peleg and Yaari
[27], Phelps and Pollak [28], and more recently, Laibson [20]. The last decision-
maker operates at time tn−1; after he has acted, the party is over. He is facing
a plain vanilla optimization problem, and solves it. His predecessor operates
at time tn−2. She is faced with a leader-follower game, which she solves by
integrating the strategy of her successor into her own decision. In principle, by
proceeding recursively in this way, one can go all the way back to t1 = 0, the
very first decision to be made (which, again, would not be the optimal one from
the time 0 perspective, if this particular decision-maker could commit all her
successors). If this method is successful, it yields a subgame perfect equilibrium,
and the corresponding policy will follow through despite the lack of commitment
devices. It is also important to observe that the equilibrium policy, as in the
prisoner’s dilemma game, is suboptimal relative to the outcome that can occur
with a pre-commitment technology. Using this approach (and extending it), a
recent literature has flourished showing that apparent irrationality of individu-
als, even in financial markets, can be ascribed to the fact that the psychological
discount factor is not exponential; see Laibson [21], O’Donoghue and Rabin
[26], Harris and Laibson [14], Krusell and Smith [19], Diamond and Koszegi
[12], Luttmer and Mariotti [23] and others.
Unfortunately, such games typically fail to have a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. The reason is that, even if u is concave with respect to c, the payoff to the
decision-maker at time ti is not concave with respect to his own consumption ci,
because ci determines the capital ki+1 at time ti+1, and constrains the choice of
the next decision-maker in a complicated, and certainly non-linear, way. Pro-
ceeding recursively from tn−1, the strategy ci = σi (ki) at time ti will end up
being discontinuous with respect to ki, which effectively kills the hope of find-
ing a subgame-perfect equilibrium. It is a fundamental difficulty of the discrete
time model, and various ways have been devised to get around this problem,
such as adding a public correlation device, as in Harris, Reny and Robson [30]
(see also [31]). With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that existence results
for subgame-perfect equilibria in continuous time are so hard to prove.
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2 Equilibrium strategies: definition
We consider an intertemporal decision problem where the decision-maker at
time t is striving to maximise:∫ T
t
h (s− t)u (c (s)) ds+ h (T − t) g (k (T )) (3)
subject to:
dk
ds
= f (s, k (s))− c (s) , k (t) = kt. (4)
Notations are as stated in the introduction. Recall that h is continuously
differentiable, with h (0) = 1, h (t) ≥ 0, h′ (t) ≤ 0, and h (t) → 0 when t → ∞.
It will also be assumed that u, f, g are twice continuously differentiable, that u
is strictly concave, and that f is strictly concave with respect to k.
We shall denote by i : Rd → Rd the inverse of the derivative u′ : Rd → Rd :
u′ (c) = x⇐⇒ c = i (x)
and it will be assumed that it is continuously differentiable. We shall also
consider the Legendre-Fenchel transform u˜ of the concave function u, defined
by:
u˜(x) = max
c∈Rd
(u(c)− xc) = u (i (x))− xi (x)
Note that it is a convex function. By the envelope theorem, we have:
u˜′(x) = −i (x) = [−u′]
−1
(x)
We now proceed to define subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies, using the
approach outlined in the introduction. A strategy c = σ (t, k) has been an-
nounced an is public knowledge. All decision-makers up to time t have applied
this strategy, that is, the dynamics of capital between times 0 and t are given
by:
dk
ds
= f (s, k)− σ (s, k) , k (0) = k0 (5)
The decision-maker at time t inherits a capital kt, which is the value at s = t
of the solution to the Cauchy problem (5). She can commit all the decision-
makers in [t, t+ ε] ,where ε > 0 is vanishingly small. She expects all later ones
to apply the strategy σ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd, and she asks herself if it is in her
own interest to apply the same strategy, that is, to consume σ (t, k). If she
consumes another bundle, c say, the immediate utility flow during [t, t+ ε] is
u (c) ε. At time t+ ε, the resulting capital will be k + (f (t, k)− c) ε, and from
then on, the strategy σ will be applied. The consumption at time s ≥ t + r is
c (s) = σ (s, k (s)) , where
dk
ds
= f (s, k (s))− σ (s, k (s)) , s ≥ t+ ε (6)
k (t+ ε) = kt + (f (t, kt)− c) ε (7)
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Denote by k0 (s) the future path of capital if the decision-maker at time t
applies the strategy σ, that is, if c = σ (t, kt). The dynamic of k0 is given by:
dk0
ds
= f (s, k0 (s))− σ (s, k0 (s)) , s ≥ t (8)
k0 (t) = kt (9)
Write k (s) = k0 (s) + k1 (s) ε, plug that into (6),(7), keeping only terms of
first order in ε. We get:
dk0
ds
+ ε
dk1
ds
= f (s, k0 (s)) + ε
∂f
∂k
(s, k0 (s)) k1 (s)− σ (s, k0 (s))
− ε
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s)) k1 (s) , s ≥ t+ ε,
k (t+ ε) = k0 (t+ ε) + εk1 (t+ ε)
= k0 (t) + ε
dk0
ds
(t) + εk1 (t+ ε)
= kt + ε (f (s, kt)− σ (t, kt)) + εk1 (t+ ε)
where ∂f∂k and
∂σ
∂k stand for the matrix of partial derivatives of f and σ with
respect to k ∈ Rd. Comparing with (8),(9) and (7), we get the linear differential
system:
dk1
ds
=
(
∂f
∂k
(s, k0 (s))−
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))
)
k1 (s) , s ≥ t+ ε
k1 (t+ ε) = σ (t, kt)− c
Summing up, we find that the total gain for the decision-maker at time t from
consuming bundle c during the interval of length ε when she can commit, is:
u (c) ε+
∫ T
t+ε
h (s− t) u (σ (s, k0 (s) + εk1 (s))) ds+ h (T − t) (g (k0 (T ) + εk1 (T )))
=
∫ T
t
h (s− t)u (σ (s, k0 (s))) ds+ h (T − t) g (k0 (T ))
+ ε
[
u (c)− u (σ(t, k)) +
∫ T
t
h (s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ (s, k0 (s)))
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s)) k1 (s) ds
+ h (T − t)
∂g
∂k
(k0 (T )) k1 (T )
]
+ h.o.t
where ∂g∂k (resp.
∂u
∂c ) is the vector of partial derivatives of g (resp. u) with
respect to k ∈ Rd (resp. c ∈ Rd) and h.o.t denotes higher-order terms in ε.
In the limit, when ε → 0, and the commitment span of the decision-maker
vanishes, we are left with two terms only. Note that the first term does not
depend on the decision taken at time t, but the second one does. This is the one
that the decision-maker at time t will try to maximize. In other words, given
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that a strategy σ has been announced and that the current state is kt = k , the
decision-maker at time t faces the optimisation problem:
max
c
P1 (t, k, σ, c) (10)
where:
P1 (t, k, σ, c) = u (c)− u (σ(t, k))
+
∫ T
t
h (s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ (s, k0 (s)))
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s)) k1 (s) ds
+ h (T − t)
∂g
∂k
(k0 (T )) k1 (T ) ,
In the above expression, k0 (s) and k1 (s) are given by:
dk0
ds
= f (s, k0 (s))− σ (s, k0 (s))
k0 (t) = k
dk1
ds
=
(
∂f
∂k
(s, k0 (s))−
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))
)
k1 (s) (11)
k1 (t) = σ (t, k)− c (12)
Definition 1 We shall say that σ : [0, T ]×Rd → Rd is an equilibrium strat-
egy for the intertemporal decision model (3),(4) if, for every t ∈ [0, T ]
and k ∈ Rd, the maximum in problem (10) is attained for c = σ (t, k):
σ (t, k) = argmax
c
P1 (t, k, σ, c)
The intuition behind this definition is quite simple. Each decision-maker
can commit only for a small time ε, so he can only hope to exert a very small
influence on the final result. In fact, if the decision-maker at time t plays c when
he/she is called to bat, while all the others are applying the strategy σ, the end
payoff for him/her will be of the form
P0 (t, k, σ) + εP1 (t, k, σ, c)
where the first term of the right hand side does not depend on c. In the absence
of commitment, the decision-maker at time t will choose whichever c maximizes
the second term εP1 (t, k, σ, c). Saying that σ is an equilibrium strategy means
that the decision maker at time t will choose c = σ (t, k), that is, that the
strategy σ can be implemented even in the absence of commitment.
Conversely, is a strategy σ for the intertemporal decision model (3),(4) is
not an equilibrium strategy, then it cannot be implemented unless the decision-
maker at time 0 has some way to commit his successors. Typically, an optimal
strategy will not be an equilibrium strategy. More precisely, a strategy which
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appears to be optimal at time 0 no longer appears to be optimal at times t > 0,
which means that the decision-maker at time t feels he can do better than
whatever was planned for him to do at time 0. In the case of macroeconomic
policy, for instance, successive governments will disagree on what is an optimal
strategy, even if they agree on the collective utility u (c), so that the concept of
equilibrium strategy seems far more reasonable - at least it stands a chance of
being implemented.
What happens then if successive decision-makers take the myopic view, and
each of them acts as if he could commit his successors ? At time t, then, the
decision-maker would maximise the integral (3) with the usual tools of control
theory, thereby deriving a consumption c = σn (t, k). This is the naive strategy;
in general it will not be an equilibrium strategy, so that every decison-maker
has an incentive to deviate. It will be studied in more detail in section 4.
3 Characterization and existence of equilibrium
strategies
In this section, we characterize equilibrium strategies of problem (??), (??),
(3), by an equation, which we call the equilibrium equation (E), and which is
reminescent - although different from - of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation of optimal control. Note that there is also an (HJB) equation associ-
ated with problem (1),(2), but it is different from the equilibrium equation, and
characterizes optimal strategies instead of equilibrium ones. We will see that
the only case when equations (E) and (HJB) coincide is the case of exponential
discount, and then equilibrium strategies are also optimal strategies.
The equilibrium equation comes in two different guises: an integrated form
(IE) and a differentiated form (DE). We first derive the integrated form, and
then we show that it is equivalent to the differentiated one. Finally, under
suitable technical conditions on the utility function u and the function f , we
show that solutions to the equilibrium equation exist close to the terminal time
T .
Given a strategy σ (t, k), we shall be dealing with the differential equation:
dk(s)
ds
= f (s, k (s))− σ (s, k (s)) (13)
k (t) = k
We shall denote by K (s, t, k) the flow associated with this equation, that is
the value at time s of the solution of (13) which takes the value k at time t. It
is defined by:
∂K (s, t, k)
∂s
= f (s,K (s, t, k))− σ (s,K (s, t, k)) (14)
K (t, t, k) = k. (15)
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In other words, K (s, t, k) is the value at time s of the solution of:
dk
ds
= f (s, k)− σ (s, k) (16)
which takes the value k at time t.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
We shall say that a function V : [0, T ]×Rd → R satisfies the integrated equilib-
rium equation (IE) if we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ] and every k :
V (t, k) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)u ◦ i
(
∂V
∂k
(s, k0(s))
)
ds+ h(T − t)g(k0(T )) ((IE))
where:
dk0
ds
= f (s, k0 (s))− i ◦
∂V
∂k
(s, k0(s))
k0 (t) = k
Note that every solution of (IE) must satisfy the boundary condition:
V (T, k) = g (k) ∀k (BC)
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium strategies and its proof
is given in the Appendix A.
Theorem 2 Let σ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd be jointly continuous, and continously
differentiable with respect to k and let K be the associated flow defined by (14),
(??). Suppose σ is an equilibrium strategy for the intertemporal decision model
(3),(4). Then the function:
V (t, k) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k)) , (17)
satisfies the integrated equilibrium equation (IE) and we have:
∂u
∂c
(σ(t, k)) =
∂V
∂k
(t, k) (18)
Conversely, if a function V is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the
integrated equilibrium equation (IE), then:
σ(t, k) = i
(
∂V
∂k
(t, k)
)
is an equilibrium strategy.
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Relation (18) says that, along an equilibrium path, the effect of an increment
to current wealth on future utility, ∂V∂k (t, k), must balance the effect of an incre-
ment to current consumption on current utility,∂u∂c (σ(t, k)). Thus, relation (18)
reflects the usual tradeoff between utility derived from current consumption and
utility value of saving.
From now on, we rewrite (IE) in the form
V (t, k) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k)) , (19)
with the understanding that K (s, t, k) is the flow associated with σ (t, k) =
i ◦ ∂V∂k (t, k).
The following proposition gives a differentiated version of the equilibrium
equation.
Proposition 3 Assume that a function V (t, k) is twice continuously differen-
tiable. Then V satisfies the integrated equilibrium equation (IE) if and only if
it satisfies the differentiated equilibrium equation:
∂V
∂t
(t, k) +
∫ T
t
h′(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ h′(T − t)g(K (T, t, k))
+ u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(t, k)
)
+
∂V
∂k
(t, k)f(t, k) = 0, (DE)
for all (t, k) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, with the boundary condition
V (T, k) = g (k) . (BC)
Appendix B proves this proposition. It may be useful to rewrite it in the
following way:
ρ(t, k) =
1
V
(
u (σ(t, k)) +
∂V
∂t
(t, k) +
∂V
∂k
(t, k)
∂K
∂s
(t, t, k)
)
(20)
where:
ρ(t, k) = −
∫ T
t
h′(s−t)
h(s−t) h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+
h′(T−t)
h(T−t) h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k))∫ T
t h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k))
is interpreted as an effective discount rate. Equation (20) then tells us that,
along an equilibrium path, the relative changes in value to the consumer must
be equal to the effective discount rate.
Finally, when the discount rate is exponential, the effective discount rate
is just the constant discount rate ρ = −h′(t)/h(t) and equation (DE) becomes
simply the familiar (HJB) equation.
Corollary 4 With the exponential discounting h(s) = e−ρs, the (DE) equation
reduces to:
∂V
∂t
(t, k)− ρV (t, k) + u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(t, k))
)
+
∂V
∂k
(t, k)f(t, k) = 0 (21)
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Proof. In the exponential case, equations (IE) and (DE) become:
V (t, k) =
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)g (K (T, t, k)) ,
∂V
∂t
(t, k)− ρ
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds− ρe−ρ(T−t)g(K (T, t, k))
+ u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(t, k))
)
+
∂V
∂k
(t, k)f(t, k) = 0.
Comparing, we immediately get (21).
3.2 Existence
Neither equation (IE) nor equation (DE) are of a classical mathematical type.
If it were not for the integral term, equation (DE) would be a first-order partial
differential equation of known type (Hamilton-Jacobi), but this additional term
(an integral along the trajectory of the flow (14) associated with the solution
V (t, k) creates additional complications.
In the sequel, we will solve that equation explicitly in particular cases. The
questions of existence and uniqueness in the general case are very much open.
In forhcoming work, Ekeland and Nirenberg prove a local existence result:
Theorem 5 Assume that all data (u, f, g and h) are analytic functions. Then,
for every k¯, there are numbers ε > 0, η > 0 and a function V (t, k), defined for
T − ε ≤ t ≤ T and
∥∥k − k¯∥∥ ≤ η, such that V satisfies (DE) and (BC)
Recall that a function is analytic at a given point if its Taylor expansion at
that point has a non-zero radius of convergence. It is analytic if it is analytic
at every point. The proof of the theorem relies on a generalized version of the
classical Cauchy-Kowalewska theorem due to Nishida and Nirenberg [24].
3.3 The infinite-horizon problem
In the sequel, we will be looking at the infinite-horizon problem, whereby the
benefit to the decision-maker at time t of a future consumption path s →
c (s) , s ≥ t, is: ∫
∞
t
h (s− t)u (c (s)) ds
The change of variables s′ = s− t ≥ 0 brings that integral to the form:∫
∞
0
h (s′)u (c (s′ + t)) ds′
which is the benefit which the decision-maker at time 0 derives from a future
consumption path s′ → c (s′ + t).
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Assume now that the problem is stationary, meaning that the production
function f (t, k) does not depend on t :
f (t, k) = f (k)
In that case, if the decision-maker at time t resets his watch, so that time
s becomes s − t, she faces exactly the same problem as the decision-maker at
time 0. Under these circumstances, it is natural to expect that, if both decision-
makers have the same capital k, they will get the same equilibrium value:
V (t, k) = V (k) ∀k
We will now look directly for time-independent value functions. Consider
the equations:
V (k) =
∫
∞
0
h (t)u
(
i ◦
∂V
∂k
(K (t, 0, k))
)
dt (22)
0 =
∂V
∂k
(k)f(k) +
∫
∞
0
h′(t)u ◦ i
(
∂V
∂k
(K (t, 0, k)
)
dt+ u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(k))
)
(23)
Lemma 6 If a C2 function V (k) satisfies equation (22) or (23), then V (t, k) :=
V (k) is a value function for the infinite-horizon problem.
Proof. It is enough to show it for equation (22). We have to prove that, for
every t, we have:
V (k) =
∫
∞
t
h (s− t)u
(
i ◦
∂V
∂k
(K (s− t, t, k))
)
ds
Note that the differential equation (14) becomes autonomous, and the function
K displays the additional property
K (s, t1, k) = K (s− t2, t1 − t2, k) , 0 < t2 < t1 < s.
Changing variables in the integral, we get:
V (k) =
∫
∞
0
h (s)u
(
i ◦
∂V
∂k
(K (s, 0, k))
)
ds
which is precisely equation (22).
If V (k) satisfies (22) or (23), the corresponding equilibrium strategy:
σ (k) = i ◦
∂V
∂k
which is time-independent, will be called stationary. Note that a stationary
problem may have non-stationary equilibria.
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4 The consumption-saving problem
In this section, we assume d = 1, so that there is only one good, and we will be
looking at a special case of the infinite-horizon problem. At any point in time
s ∈ [0,∞) the consumer has a stock of wealth k(s) ∈ (0,∞) and receives a flow
of labor income w(s) as well as a flow of interest income r(s)k(s). Beginning
with a capital stock k ∈ (0,∞) at time t, we formulate the consumption-saving
problem by
max
∫
∞
t
h (s− t)u (c (s)) ds (24)
dk(s)
ds
= w(s) + r(s)k(s) − c(s), k (t) = kt. (25)
This is a special case of the general problem (3), (4), with:
f (t, k) := w (t) + r (t) k
We emphasize that at any point in time t ∈ [0,∞) the consumer takes as
given the interest rate r(t) and the wage w(t). Since r (t) and w (t) are time-
dependent, we expect the value function to be non-stationary, even though the
horizon is infinite.
Equation (IE) becomes
V (t, k) =
∫
∞
t
h(s− t)u ◦ i
(
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))
)
ds (26)
where the flow K (s, t, k) solves
dK (s, t, k)
ds
= w(s) + r(s)K (s, t, k)− i ◦
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k)) (27)
K (t, t, k) = k. (28)
The next subsection gives explicit solutions when the utility function is in
the CRRA class.
4.1 CRRA preferences
In this section, we shall assume that d = 1 and that the utility function takes
one of the forms:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
, γ > 0
u (c) = ln c
the latter corresponding to γ = 1.An explicit construction of the equilibrium
strategy will be shown to be possible under an additional assumption:
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Assumption A: There is at least one non-negative function t→ λ (t) which
solves the fixed-point problem:
λ(t) =
[∫
∞
t
λ(s)1−γ exp
[
− (1− γ)
∫ s
t
(λ(u)− r(u))du
]
h(s− t)ds
]− 1
γ
(29)
Proposition 7 If the utility function is CRRA and λ (t) is given by (29), the
strategy
σ(t, k) = λ(t)
[
k +
∫
∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ s
t
r(u)du
]
w(s)ds
]
(30)
is an equilibrium strategy for the infinite-horizon problem. The associated value
function is given by
V (t, k) = [λ(t)]−γ
[
k +
∫
∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ s
t
r(u)du
]
w(s)ds
]1−γ
1− γ
.
The equilibrium policy (30) consists of consuming the proportion λ (t) of
current wealth; the latter is the sum of the current capital stock and the present
value of future wages.
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in Appendix C
We now investigate equation (29) more closely. There are three cases where
it can be solved easily:
4.1.1 Constant discounting
In the case when h(s) = e−ρs, we find that the function
λ¯(t) :=
exp
[
1
γ
∫ t
0 ((1− γ)r(s)− ρ) ds
]
∫
∞
t
exp
[
1
γ
∫ s
0
((1− γ)r(u)− ρ) du
]
ds
solves the equation (29) provided that the above integrals are well-defined.
Therefore, the policy
σ(t, k) = λ¯(t)
[
k +
∫
∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ s
t
r(u)du
]
w(s)ds
]
(31)
is an equilibrium policy. Note that this is precisely the optimal policy from
the time t perspective, which was expected anyway, since, with exponential
discount, optimal policies are equilibrium policies.
4.1.2 Logarithmic utility
We are now back with a general discount function h (t), but we choose a partic-
ular utility function, namely u (c) = ln c, so that γ = 1. The equation reduces
to:
λ(t) =
[∫
∞
t
h(s− t)ds
]−1
=
[∫
∞
0
h (t) dt
]−1
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So λ is constant (in spite of the fact that the interest rate on capital r (t) is
time-dependent). This fact was first observed by Barro [5]. The corresponding
equilibrium strategy is:
σ(t, k) =
1∫
∞
0 h(s)ds
[
k +
∫
∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ s
t
r(u)du
]
w(s)ds
]
(32)
4.1.3 Knife-edge case
Assume the interest rate on capital is constant and given by
r =
(∫
∞
0
h(s)ds
)−1
We seek to solve equation (29) for a constant λ. This yields:
λ =
[∫
∞
t
λ1−γe−(1−γ)(λ−r)(s−t)h(s− t)ds
]− 1
γ
=
[∫
∞
t
λ1−γh(s− t)ds
]− 1
γ
= λ−
1−γ
γ
[∫
∞
0
h(s)ds
]− 1
γ
so that λ = r. The corresponding equilibrium is given by:
σ(t, k) = r
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t)w(s)ds
]
.
Given that along this equilibrium path, the consumers will consume the
annuity value of the wealth, the above equilibrium is consistent with Friedman’s
permanent-income model. Note that this equilibrium strategy would also be
the optimal strategy for the case of a constant discount rate equal to r, so that
h(s) = e−rs.
4.2 Constant interest rate
In this subsection, we shall assume that the interest rate on capital is constant:
r (t) = r
The following examples provide, for some specific discount functions h, ex-
plicit formulas for some equilibrium strategies with constant propensity to con-
sume out of wealth.
4.2.1 Exponential discount
When the discount function is exponential h(s) = e−ρs, the equation (29) for λ
takes the form
1 = λ
∫
∞
t
e−(ρ+(λ−r)(1−γ))(s−t)ds,
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where r > 0 is the constant interest rate. If the above integral is well defined,
we see that:
λ = r +
ρ− r
γ
=: λ0.
The policy
σ(t, k) = λ0
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−r(s−t)w(s)ds
]
is an equilibrium policy provided λ0 > 0, that is ρ− r(1 − γ) > 0.
4.2.2 A mixture of exponential discount functions
For convenience, assume that γ > 1.
Consider the case when the discount function is the mixture of two expo-
nential functions, that is:
h(s) = ωe−ρ1s + (1 − ω)e−ρ2s,
where 0 < ρ1 < ρ2, and ω ∈ [0, 1]. The instantaneous discount rate associated
to h at time t is
−
h′(t)
h(t)
= ρ1 + (ρ2 − ρ1)
1− ω
ωe(ρ2−ρ1)t + (1− ω)
and is gradually declining from ρ0 := ωρ1 + (1 − ω)ρ2 (at time t = 0) to ρ1
(at time t = ∞). Therefore, this specification captures the idea that discount
rates decline with the horizon over which utility is discounted, a feature that
O’Donoghue an Rabin ([25], [26]) call the “present bias”. The mixture of expo-
nential discount function also corresponds to what Harris and Laibson [16] call
the ”auxiliary model”.
If the discount rate were constant and equal to the long term value ρ1, we
would have a stationary equilibrium policy where λ = r + (ρ1 − r) /γ.If the
discount rate were constant and equal to the short term value ρ0, we would
have a stationary equilibrium policy where λ = r + (ρ0 − r) /γ. Each of them
would be optimal in its own context, given that the discount rate is constant.
In the general case where ω ∈ (0, 1), so that the discount rate declines from
ρ0 to ρ1, we look for an equilibrium policy where the propensity to consume
out of wealth is a constant λ. After integrating, equation (29) turns out to be
equivalent to the following:
f(λ) :=
ω
ρ1 + (λ − r)(1 − γ)
+
1− ω
ρ2 + (λ− r)(1 − γ)
−
1
λ
= 0, (33)
provided that the integrability conditions:
ρi + (λ− r)(1 − γ) > 0, i = 1, 2 (34)
are satisfied.
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The function f is increasing on the interval (0, r + ρ1γ−1) and furthermore
f(0) = −∞ and f(r + ρ1γ−1 ) = +∞. Therefore there must exist a unique value
λ1 ∈ (0, r +
ρ1
γ−1) such that f(λ1) = 0. Recalling that γ > 1, it is easy to see
that λ1 satisfies the integrability condition (34) and a further inspection reveals
that λ1 is the unique solution of the recursion (33) satisfying the integrability
condition (34). Therefore, λ1 gives rise to an equilibrium strategy.
Evaluating f at λ gives
f(λ) = γ(1− γ)
[
1
ρ1 + γ(ρ2 − ρ1)− r(1 − γ)
−
1
ρ1 − r(1 − γ)
]
< 0,
and since f is increasing, we obtain that λ < λ1.
If the interest rate r has the precise value:
r =
1
ω
ρ1
+ 1−ωρ2
then λ1 = r is the solution, and in that case λ < λ1 < λ¯.
4.2.3 Quasi hyperbolic discount.
We define the discount function (in continuous time) as
h(s) =
{
e−ρs for 0 ≤ s ≤ τ
δe−ρs for s > τ
where τ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1].
When δ = 1, the discount is exponential and the equilibrium is the one
described in the preceding subsection assuming that ρ˜ = ρ − r(1 − γ) > 0. If
δ < 1, assuming a time invariant propensity to consume out of wealth, and
integrating the equation (29) yields:
1 =
λ
ρ˜+ λ(1− γ)
[
1− (1− δ)e−(ρ˜+λ(1−γ))τ
]
,
or equivalently f (λ) = 0, where:
f (λ) = γ − (1− δ)e−(ρ˜+λ(1−γ))τ −
ρ˜
λ
provided that an integrability condition holds:
ρ˜+ λ(1 − γ) > 0 (35)
If 0 < γ < 1, we see that f ′ > 0 and thus f is non decreasing. On the other
hand, when f(λ)→ −∞ when λ→ 0, λ ≥ 0, and f(λ)→ γ when λ→∞ so that
there must exist a unique λ2 such that f(λ2) = 0. Since γ < 1, the integrability
condition (35) is satisfied
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If γ > 1, we have f (λ)→ −∞ when λ→ 0, λ > 0, and f
(
− ρ˜1−γ
)
= δ > 0,
so that f has at least one root λ2 satisfying the integrability condition.
So the existence of an equilibrium strategy with a constant propensity to
consume λ (t) = λ2 is proved in all cases.
In the limiting case when τ → 0, whe obtain the instant gratification model
of Harris and Laibson [16]. Then:
λ2 →
ρ+ r(γ − 1)
δ + γ − 1
which satisfies the integrability condition (35) when γ > 1.
4.2.4 General hyperbolic discount function
We consider the discount function
h(s) =
1
(1 + αs)
β
α
e−ρs, α > 0, β > 0 and ρ > 0
specified by Luttmer and Mariotti [23] and which particularizes, when ρ = 0,
the generalized hyperbolic discount function reported in Loewenstein and Prelec
[22]. The resulting discount rate:
−
h′(s)
h(s)
= ρ+
β
1 + αs
is smoothly declining from ρ + β (at s = 0) to ρ (at s = ∞). The coefficient
α determines how close the discount function h is to the exponentials e−ρs and
e−(ρ+β)s.
The equation (29) becomes
1 = λ
∫
∞
0
1
(1 + αs)
β
α
e−(ρ+(λ−r)(1−γ))sds
provided the integrability condition ρ+ (λ − r)(1 − γ) > 0 is satisfied.
We define the function
f(λ) =
∫
∞
0
1
(1 + αs)
β
α
e−(ρ+(λ−r)(1−γ))sds−
1
λ
and verify that f(0) = −∞, f
(
r + ργ−1
)
= +∞ and f ′ > 0. Therefore, there
exist a unique
λ3 ∈ (0, r +
ρ
γ − 1
)
such that f(λ3) = 0 and such that the integrability condition ρ+(λ3−r)(1−γ) >
0 is satisfied.
19
4.3 Comparative analysis.
We want compare the equilibrium strategy with the strategy which, from the
point of view of the decision-maker at time t = 0, is optimal. We shall do so
in the case when the interest rate r and the wage w are constant, and when
u (c) = ln c.
The equilibrium strategy, as we saw earlier, then is time-independent and
consists of consuming a constant fraction of current wealth:
σ(k) =
1∫
∞
0
h(s)ds
[
k +
w
r
]
(36)
Note that, for the model to be meaningful, we must have:
r >
1∫
∞
0 h(s)ds
otherwise equation (36) would mean that in equilibrium, consumption is greater
that income. This makes sense: if the interest on capital is lower than the
psychological discount rate, there is no point in investing.
Let us put ourselves in the shoes of the decision-maker at time t = 0, endowed
with a capital k0, and find the optimal strategy from her point of view. Solving
the optimal control problem:
max
∫
∞
0
h (t) ln c (t) dt
dk
dt
= rk + w − c, k (0) = k0
we find, by the Euler-Lagrange equation:
1
c
dc
dt
= r +
h′ (t)
h (t)
which we integrate, to get:
c (t) = c0h (t) e
rt
Substituting into the dynamics, we get:
dk
dt
= rk + w − c0h (t) e
rt
which we integrate, to get:
k (t) =
(
k0 +
w
r
− c0
∫ t
0
h (s) ds
)
ert −
w
r
Because of the transversality condition at infinity, we must have:
c0 =
1∫
∞
0
h (s) ds
(
k0 +
w
r
)
(37)
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and the optimal propensity to consume at time t is:
λ (t) =
c (t)
k (t) + wr
=
c0h (t)(
k0 +
w
r − c0
∫ t
0
h (s) ds
)
=
h (t)(
H −
∫ t
0 h (s) ds
) = h (t)(∫ ∞
t
h (s) ds
)−1
At time t = 0, we find λ (0) =
(∫
∞
0
h (s) ds
)−1
. This is precisely the equi-
librium value, as defined by (36). The optimal propensity to consume, λ (t), is
time-dependent, and deviates from the equilibrium value λ (0). Note that:
λ′ (0) =
1∫
∞
0 h (s) ds
(
h′ (0) +
1∫
∞
0 h (s) ds
)
so that λ (t) may be greater or smaller than the equilibrium value, according
to the characteristics of the discount function h. Applying the optimal strat-
egy (from the point of view of time 0) yields the following dynamic (we set∫
∞
0
h (s) ds = H for the sake of convenience) ::
k (t) =
(
k0 +
w
r
−
(
k0 +
w
r
) 1
H
∫ t
0
h (s) ds
)
ert −
w
r
c (t) = c0h (t) e
rt =
1
H
(
k0 +
w
r
)
h (t) ert
Applying the equilibrium strategy yields the following dynamics:
k (t) = k0e
(r−1/H)t + w
1 − 1/rH
r − 1/H
(
1− e(r−1/H)t
)
c (t) =
1
H
(
w
r
+ k0e
(r−1/H)t + w
1 − 1/rH
r − 1/H
(
1− e(r−1/H)t
))
Note, however, a remarkable fact. Define the naive strategy as follows: every
decision-maker acts as if she could commit her successors; she computes the
control c (s) which is optimal on the interval [t,∞], and consumes c (t). From
the previous analysis it follows that the naive strategy is an equilibrium strategy.
This, of course, is particular to the logarithmic case u (c) = ln c.
5 Indeterminacy in the Ramsey growth problem
We now go back to the general problem (3), (4) in the stationary case, where
the production function is given by:
f (t, k) = f (k)
We then interpret the problem as the Ramsey problem in growth theory. It
is well-known, and described for instance in the textbook by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin [6], that there are two versions to that problem:
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1. The centralized version. A benevolent planner, seeking to maximize the
integral (3) which measures global welfare, determines an optimal growth
strategy σ (t, k) and commits citizens to consume σ (t, k) and to invest the
remainder
2. The decentralized version. Future interest rates r1 (t) and future wages
w1 (t) are common knowledge. The representative individual then solves
the consumption-saving problem, taking r1 (t) and w1 (t) as given. This
determines the rate of investment at any time t. This is turn determines
the wages w2 (t) that the production sector can offer, and the capital rental
interest r2 (t). One wants r1 = r2 and w1 = w2.
In the case of exponential discount, h (t) = e−ρt, both problems have the
same solution (see [6]): if σ (t, k) is a solution of the centralized problem, and
k (t) the corresponding optimal trajectory, then w1 (t) := f (k) − k (t) f
′ (k (t))
and r1 (t) := f
′ (k) have the property that r1 = r2 and w1 = w2.
These notions naturally extend to more general discount functions. In the
absence of commitment technology, one must replace optimal policies by equilib-
rium policies, and one is naturally led to two notions of and equilibrium growth
policy:
1. The centralized version. There is a succession of benevolent planners,
each of them holding power during an infinitesimal period of time, and
having the ability to commit their contemporaries in the consumption
and production sectors during that period. They agree on an equilibrium
strategy σ (t, k) for the problem (3), (4).
2. The decentralized version. Future interest rates r1 (t) and future wages
w1 (t) are common knowledge. There is a succession of representative in-
dividuals, and they agree on an equilibrium strategy for the consumption-
saving problem (24), (25), taking r1 (t) and w1 (t) as given. This deter-
mines the rate of investment at any time t. This is turn determines the
wages w2 (t) that the production sector can offer, and the capital rental
interest r2 (t). One wants r1 = r2 and w1 = w2.
In continuity with the results for the exponential discount, one would natu-
rally expect that the two problems coincide, but this is no longer the case.
The results in Barro [5] pertain to the second problem. To the best of our
knowledge the first one, that is, the study of the planner’s problem in optimal
growth theory under time inconsistency, has not been studied. The remainder
of this paper is devoted to shedding some light on that problem. As in classical
growth theory, we will concentrate on the one-dimensional case: d = 1 .
Definition 8 Take a point k¯. We shall say that k¯ is an equilibrium point if
there is a stationary equilibrium strategy σ (k), defined on a neighbourhood Ω
of k¯ in Rd, and such that all trajectories of (13) starting inside Ω when t = 0
converge to k¯ when t→∞.
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It follows from the definition that the trajectory starting from k¯ is k¯ itself:
the solution of (13) with k (0) = k¯ is k (t) = k¯ for all t. Denoting by c¯ the
consumption along that trajectory, we must have:
c¯ = f
(
k¯
)
Theorem 9 Assume that k¯ is an equilibrium point, and that the corresponding
value function V (k) is C2 in a neighbourhood of k¯. Then the number α defined
by:
α :=
V ′′
(
k¯
)
u′′ (c¯)
must satisfy:
α ≥ f ′
(
k¯
)
> 0 (38)
If α > f ′
(
k¯
)
, then:
α
∫
∞
0
h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt = 1 (39)
The proof is given in Appendix D
Corollary 10 Set h (t) = e−ρt. Assume that k¯ is an equilibrium point. Then:
f ′
(
k¯
)
= ρ (40)
and,
α ≡
V ′′(k¯)
u′′(c¯)
= f ′(k¯)

1 +
√
1 + 4u
′(k¯)f ′′(k¯)
ρ2u′′(k¯)
2

 > f ′(k¯) (41)
In the exponential case equation (39) degenerates: it sets no condition on α,
but determines k¯ through (40). This is the well-known relation for the optimal
growth path, which usually is obtained by the transversality condition at infinity,
and which here is derived in a novel way.
In the general case, as we will see in the following example, equation (39)
does not determine k¯: it determines α as a function of k¯. The proof is given in
the appendix.
Proposition 11 Set h (t) = e−rt on [0, T ], and h (t) = 0 for t > T . Assume
that k¯ is an equilibrium point. Then, there exists a decreasing function ϕ :
]0,∞[→]0,∞[, with:
ϕ (α)→∞ when α→ 0
ϕ (1) = 1
and a number a (T ) ≤ 1/T such that conditions (39), (38) are equivalent to the
following:
0 < f ′
(
k¯
)
− r ≤ 1/T (42)
αT = ϕ
([
f ′
(
k¯
)
− r
]
T
)
(43)
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In other words, there is a continuous family of solutions to equation (39), one
for each k¯ such that f ′
(
k¯
)
falls in the interval (ρ, ρ+1/T ). The corresponding
α
(
k¯
)
goes to ∞ when f ′
(
k¯
)
→ ρ and to 1/T when f ′
(
k¯
)
→ ρ + 1/T . Note
that there is no solution for f ′
(
k¯
)
≤ ρ of f ′
(
k¯
)
≥ ρ+ 1/T
For future reference, we write a few properties of the function ϕ. They follow
easily from the properties of the function xe−x :
x1 < x2 =⇒ ϕ (x1) < ϕ (x2)
ϕ (x)→∞ when x→∞,
ϕ (x)→ 0 when x→∞
xϕ (x) = ψ
(
xe−x
)
with ψ (0) = 0, ψ′ (0) = 1,when x ≥ 1
We now want to know what happens when the horizon T goes to 0 (instant
gratification) or ∞ (exponential discount). Let (α (T ) , k (T )) be a solution of
equation (39) with h (t) as above:
α (T )
∫ T
0
e−ρt exp [(f ′ (k (T ))− α (T )) t] dt = 1 (44)
• Let T →∞. Assume k (T )→ k¯ and α (T )→ α¯ > 0. Then:
f ′
(
k¯
)
= ρ
• Let T → 0. Assume k (T )→ k¯ and α (T )→ α¯ > 0. Then:
k¯ = 0
The proof of the first part follows immediately from the estimate 0 <
f ′ (k (T ))− ρ ≤ 1/T . For the second, we have α (T ) = ϕ (f ′ (k (T ))T − ρT ) /T .
Since the left-hand side converges, so must the right-hand side, so ϕ (f ′ (k (T )) T − ρT )
must go to infinity when T → 0, which is only possible if f ′ (k (T ))→∞. Since
f satisfies the Inada conditions, we must have k (T )→ 0, as announced,
These results are conform to economic intuition. Note in particular that,
when T →∞, we find again the condition f ′
(
k¯
)
= ρ in the limit. However, for
finite T , equation (39) does not determine k (T ), which is a striking difference
with T = ∞. In this, as in the general case of non-constant discount, we
have been unable to find any further condition that would determine k (T ).
This would indicate non-uniqueness of possible k (T ), and hence a multiplicity
of equilibrium strategies, one for each possible value of k (T ) and α (T ). The
following results, which are valid in the case of general non-constant discounts,
indicates that, even with non-uniqueness, there is a definite range of possible
equilibrium values for k¯.
Corollary 12 Assume that the discount function h (t) satisfies:
e−ρ2t ≤ h (t) ≤ e−ρ1t for t ≥ 0
for some 0 < ρ1 ≤ ρ2, and that k¯ is an equilibrium point for h. Then:
ρ1 ≤ f
′
(
k¯
)
≤ ρ2
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Proof. From equation (39), we have:
1 = α
∫
∞
0
h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt (45)
≤ α
∫
∞
0
exp
[(
−r1 + f
′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt (46)
=
α
r1 − f ′
(
k¯
)
+ α
(47)
and this gives f ′
(
k¯
)
≥ r1. Hence the result
More generally, we have the following result:
Proposition 13 Assume that the discount functions h1 and h satisfy:
h0 (t) ≤ h1 (t) for t ≥ 0
Denote by K0 and K1 the set of equilibrium points for h0 and h1 respectively.
Then:
supK0 ≤ supK1
Proof. Assume otherwise, so that there exists some k¯0 ∈ K0 such that k¯0 >
supK1. Then there exists some k¯1 /∈ K1 with k¯1 < k¯0. . Since f is strictly
concave, we must have f ′
(
k¯0
)
< f ′
(
k¯1
)
. Set:
ϕ0 (α) := α
∫
∞
0
h0 (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯0
)
− α
)
t
]
dt (48)
ϕ1 (α) := α
∫
∞
0
h1 (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯1
)
− α
)
t
]
dt (49)
Since k¯1 /∈ K1, we have ϕ1 (α) 6= 1 for all α > 0. Since ϕ1 (α) → 0 when
α → ∞, this implies that ϕ1 (α) < 1 for all α > 0. Since h0 ≤ h1 and
f ′
(
k¯0
)
≤ f ′
(
k¯1
)
, we have ϕ0 ≤ ϕ1, such that ϕ1 (α) < 1 for all α > 0.
6 Conclusion
This paper tried to model the idea that the decision-maker at time t cannot com-
mit her successors by imagining that she can commit her immediate successors,
those in the interval [t, t+ ε], and letting ε→ 0. We then gave a rigourous def-
inition of (subgame perfect) equilibrium strategies, characterize them through
the equations (IE) and (DE). We give a local existence result in the analytic
case.
One would, of course, like to have a global existence result, on Rd × [0, T ],
and to have weaker regularity assumptions (sufficiently differentiable instead
of analytic). Unfortunately, proving such a theorem presents us with some
serious mathematical challenges, and much more work is required before we
understand the situation. In fact, it seems to be very similar to the situation
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wich prevailed on the (HJB) equation itself before the discovery of viscosity
solutions by Mike Crandall and Pierre-Louis Lions when issues of existence,
uniqueness and regularity where intertwined in a very unsatisfactory manner.
We feel that a similar program has to be undertaken for equation (DE).
Another question is: why the continuous time ? Would it not be easier to
work with discrete time, and actually get the continous case by an appropriate
limiting process from the discrete case ? The answer, as we pointed out in the
introduction, is that we have no existence result for subgame perfect equilib-
rium in the discrete case, so it is by no means clear that it is easier than the
continuous case. When Aumann started the study of economies with a contin-
uum of consumers, theorems were first proved directly, and the connection with
economies with a large number of consumers came much later. For instance, the
fact that if one constructs an economy with Nn agents by replicatingN times an
economy with n agents, the core of the large economy converges to the equilibria
of the limiting economy (which has a continuum of agents) was first proved by
Herbert Scarf, and was hailed as a major achievement. Here again, such limiting
results may hold for equilibrium strategies, but it is another research program.
Finally, the obvious economic question is whether equilibrium strategies are
observationally different from optimal strategies. The difficulty here is that,
although the equilibrium strategy is defined for all (t, k), we only observe one
trajectory of the dynamics, the one that starts at k0 at time t = 0. Devising
testable consequences for our model will be a third research program.
A Proof of Theorem 2:
A.1 Preliminaries
Before proceeding with the proof of the theorem, let us mention some facts
about the flow K defined by (14), (15).
Note first that the solution of (14) which takes the value k at time t coincides
with the solution of the same equation which takes the value K (s1, t, k) at time
s1. In mathematical terms, this property may be stated as
K (s2, t, k) = K (s2, s1,K (s1, t, k)) , 0 < t < s1 < s2 < T. (50)
Next, consider the linearized equation around a prescribed solution t→ k0 (t)
of the nonlinear system (16), namely:
dk
ds
=
(
∂f
∂k
(s, k0 (s))−
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))
)
k (s) (51)
This is a linear equation, so the flow is linear. The value at time s of
the solution which takes the value k at time t is R(s, t)k, where the matrix
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R(·, t) : [t, T ] −→ Rd×d satisfies:
dR
ds
(s, t) =
(
∂f
∂k
(s, k0 (s))−
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))
)
R (s, t) (52)
R (t, t) = I (53)
From standard theory, it is well known that, if f and σ are Ck, then K is
Ck−1, and:
∂K (s, t, k)
∂k
= R(t, s)
∂K (s, t, k)
∂t
= −R(t, s) (f (t, k)− σ (t, k))
where R(t, s) is computed by setting k0 (s) = K (s, t, k) in formulas (52), (53).
Let us now turn to the actual proof of Theorem 2:
A.2 Necessary condition
Given an equilibrium strategy σ, define a function V by:
V (t, k) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds+ h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k)) , (54)
Differentiating with respect to k, we find that:
∂V
∂k
(t, k) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ(s,K (s, t, k)))
∂σ
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))
∂K
∂k
(s, t, k) ds
+ h(T − t)
∂g
∂k
(K (T, t, k))
∂K
∂k
(T, t, k)
=
∫ T
t
h(s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ(s,K (s, t, k)))
∂σ
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))R(s, t)ds
+ h(T − t)
∂g
∂k
(K (T, t, k))R(T, t)
The (IE) equation will be derived by maximizing the individual payoff P1 (t, k, σ, c),
as in formula (10). To this end, let us first notice that the function k1 defined
by (11) and (12) can be written as
k1(s) = R(s, t) (σ(t, k) − c) ,
so that the individual payoff becomes
P1 (t, k, σ, c) = u (c)− u (σ(t, k))
+
∫ T
t
h (s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ (s, k0 (s)))
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))R (s, t) (σ(t, k) − c) ds
+ h (T − t)
∂g
∂k
(k0 (T ))R(T, t) (σ(t, k)− c)
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Since u is concave and differentiable, the necessary and sufficient condition
to maximize P1(t, k, σ, c) with respect to c is
∂u
∂c
(c) =
∫ T
t
h(s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ(s,K (s, t, k)))
∂σ
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))R(s, t)ds
+ h(T − t)
∂g
∂k
(K (T, t, k))R(T, t) =
∂V
∂k
(t, k).
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy must satisfy
∂u
∂c
(σ(t, k)) =
∂V
∂k
(t, k)
and, substituting back into equation (54), gives the (IE) equation.
A.3 Sufficient condition
Assume now that there exists a function V satisfying (IE) and (BC), and con-
sider the strategy σ = i ◦ ∂V∂k . Given any consumption choice c ∈ R
d, the payoff
to the decision-maker at time t is:
P1 (t, k, σ, c) = u (c)− u (σ(t, k))
+
[∫ T
t
h (s− t)
∂u
∂c
(σ (s, k0 (s)))
∂σ
∂k
(s, k0 (s))R(s, t)ds
+h (T − t)
∂g
∂k
(k0 (T ))R(T, t)
]
(σ (t, k)− c)
= u (c)− u (σ(t, k)) +
∂V
∂k
(t, k) (σ (t, k)− c)
= u (c)− u (σ(t, k)) −
∂u
∂c
(σ (t, k)) (c− σ (t, k))
≤ 0,
where the first equality follows from the definition of R, the second equality is
obtained by differentiating V with respect to k, the third equality follows from
the definition of σ, and the last inequality is due to the concavity of u. Observing
that P1(t, k, σ, σ (t, k)) = 0, we see that the inequality P1(t, k, σ, c) ≤ 0 proves
that c = σ (t, k) achieves the maximum so that σ is an equilibrium strategy.
Q.E.D.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Let a function V : [0, T ]×Rd → Rd be given. Consider the function:
ϕ (t, k) = V (t, k)−
∫ T
t
h(s− t)u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))) ds− h(T − t)g (K (T, t, k))
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where σ = i ◦ ∂V∂k .
Consider the value of ϕ along the trajectory of (13) originating from k at
time t. It is given by:
ψ (s, t, k) = ϕ (s,K (s, t, k))
= V (s,K (s, t, k))
−
∫ T
s
h(x− s)u (σ(x,K (x, s,K (s, t, k)))) dx
− h(T − s)g (K (T, s,K (s, t, k)))
= V (s,K (s, t, k))
−
∫ T
s
h(x− s)u (σ(x,K (x, t, k))) dx
− h(T − s)g (K (T, t, k))
where we have used formula (50).
We compute the derivative of this function with respect to s:
∂ψ
∂s
(s, k, t) =
∂V
∂t
(s,K (s, t, k)) +
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k)) (f (s,K (s, t, k))− σ (s,K (s, t, k)))
+
∫ T
s
h′(x− s)u (σ(x,K (x, t, k))) ds+ u (σ(s,K (s, t, k))
+ h′(T − s)g (K (T, t, k))
Since σ = i ◦ ∂V∂k , we have:
−
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))σ (s,K (s, t, k)) + u (σ(s,K (s, t, k)) = u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))
)
Substituting in the above, we get:
∂ψ
∂s
(s, k, t) =
∂V
∂t
(s,K (s, t, k)) +
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k)) f (s,K (s, t, k))
+
∫ T
s
h′(x− s)u (σ(x,K (x, t, k))) ds+ u˜
(
∂V
∂k
(s,K (s, t, k))
)
+ h′(T − s)g (K (T, t, k))
If (DE) holds, then ψ (s, k, t) = ψ (T, k, t), and if (BC) holds, then ψ is
identically zero, so that (IE) holds. Conversely, if (IE) holds, then (BC) and
(DE) obviously hold. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 7
Define the function
M(s, t, k) = K(s, t, k)e−
∫
s
t
(r(u)−λ(u))du
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with the understanding that the flow K is associated to the strategy (30). Then
we have
dM (s, t, k)
ds
= w(s)e−
∫
s
t
(r(u)−λ(u))du−λ(s)e−
∫
s
t
(r(u)−λ(u))du
∫
∞
s
e−
∫
u
s
r(v)dvw(u)du
and after integrating this equation on [t, s] we get
M (s, t, k) = k +
∫ s
t
e−
∫
u
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dxw(u)du
−
∫ s
t
λ(u)e−
∫
u
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
[∫
∞
u
e−
∫
v
u
r(x)dxw(v)dv
]
du. (55)
The last term of this equality may be transformed into∫ s
t
λ(u)e−
∫
u
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
[∫
∞
u
e−
∫
v
u
r(x)dxw(v)dv
]
du
=
∫ s
t
λ(u)e
∫
u
t
λ(x)dx
[∫
∞
t
e−
∫
v
t
r(x)dxw(v)dv −
∫ u
t
e−
∫
v
t
r(x)dxw(v)dv
]
du
=
[∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
] [∫ s
t
λ(u)e
∫
u
t
λ(x)dxdu
]
−
∫ s
t
λ(u)e
∫
u
t
λ(x)dx
[∫ u
t
e−
∫
v
t
r(x)dxw(v)dv
]
du
=
[∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
] [
e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx − 1
]
−
∫ s
t
e−
∫
v
t
r(x)dxw(v)
[∫ s
v
λ(u)e
∫
u
t
λ(x)dxdu
]
dv
=
[∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
] [
e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx − 1
]
−
∫ s
t
e−
∫
v
t
r(x)dxw(v)
[
e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx − e
∫
v
t
λ(x)dx
]
dv
=
[∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
] [
e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx − 1
]
− e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx
∫ s
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
+
∫ s
t
e−
∫
u
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dxw(u)du
where the third equality follows from Fubini Theorem. Substituting this formu-
lation in equation (55) yields
M (s, t, k) = k +
∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du − e
∫
s
t
λ(x)dx
[∫
∞
s
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]
and therefore,
K (s, t, k) = e
∫
s
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]
−
∫
∞
s
e−
∫
u
s
r(x)dxw(u)du.
Denoting by V (t, k) the utility associated to the strategy σ defined by (30),
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we see that
V (t, k) =
∫
∞
t
[σ(s,K (s, t, k))]
1−γ
1− γ
h(s− t)ds
=
∫
∞
t
[
λ(s)e
∫
s
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
]1−γ
1− γ
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]1−γ
h(s− t)ds
=
[
k +
∫
∞
t e
−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]1−γ
1− γ
∫
∞
t
[
λ(s)e
∫
s
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
]1−γ
h(s− t)ds
and that,
∂V
∂k
(t, k) =
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]−γ ∫ ∞
t
[
λ(s)e
∫
s
t
(r(x)−λ(x))dx
]1−γ
h(s−t)ds.
Now, since the recursion (29) is satisfied, we see that
∂V
∂k
(t, k) =
[
k +
∫
∞
t
e−
∫
u
t
r(x)dxw(u)du
]−γ
[λ(t)]
−γ
= (σ(t, k))
−γ
.
Therefore, the integrated equation (26) is satisfied which in turn establishes that
the strategy σ defined by (30) is an equilibrium strategy for the non-stationary
problem (24), (25) .
D Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Write equation (DE) for the function V (k):
u˜ (V ′) + fV ′ +
∫
∞
0
h′ (t)u (c (t)) dt = 0
with c (t) = σ (K (t, k)) = i (V ′ (K (t, k))).
Differentiate it at the equilibrium point k¯. We get:
(
u˜′
(
V ′
(
k¯
))
+ f
(
k¯
))
V ′′
(
k¯
)
+f ′
(
k¯
)
V ′
(
k¯
)
+
∫
∞
0
h′ (t)u′ (c¯)) i′
(
V ′
(
k¯
))
V ′′
(
k¯
) ∂K (t, k)
∂k
dt
(56)
We have u˜′
(
V ′
(
k¯
))
= −i
(
V ′
(
k¯
))
= −c¯, so that the first term vanishes.
We are left with the two others. Note first that i′ (c) = −u˜′′ (c) = −1/u′′ (c),
so that the last integral can be rewritten as follows:
−
u′ (c¯)
u′′ (c¯)
V ′′
(
k¯
) ∫ ∞
0
h′ (t)
∂K (t, k)
∂k
dt
The function y (t) = ∂K (t, k) /∂k is the solution of the linearized system at
k¯:
dy
dt
=
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− i′
(
V ′
(
k¯
))
V ′′
(
k¯
))
y =
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
y (57)
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Since k¯ is an attractor, the exponent
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
must be non-positive, so
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α ≤ 0, which is condition (38).
From now on, we assume f ′
(
k¯
)
−α < 0 , so that the linearized equation (57)
converges, and we have:
∂K (t, k)
∂k
= exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
This gives us the last term in (56). We now compute the middle term by
differentiating the formula for V :
V (k) =
∫
∞
0
h (t)u (c (t)) dt
yielding, by the same computation:
V ′
(
k¯
)
= −
u′ (c¯)
u′′ (c¯)
V ′′
(
k¯
) ∫ ∞
0
h (t)
∂K (t, k)
∂k
dt
= −
u′ (c¯)
u′′ (c¯)
V ′′
(
k¯
) ∫ ∞
0
h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt
Substituting in equation (56), we get:
u′ (c¯)
u′′ (c¯)
V ′′
(
k¯
) [
f ′
(
k¯
) ∫ ∞
0
h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt+
∫
∞
0
h′ (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt
]
= 0
and hence:
f ′
(
k¯
)
= −
∫
∞
0 h
′ (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt∫
∞
0 h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt
=
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
) ∫
∞
0 h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt+ 1∫
∞
0
h (t) exp
[(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt
where we have integrated by parts. This in turn gives formula (39) and concludes
the proof.
E Proof of Corollary 10
Substitute into equation (39). We get for α the equation.
1 = α
∫
∞
0
exp
[
−ρ+ f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
]
dt =
α
ρ− f ′
(
k¯
)
+ α
If f ′
(
k¯
)
6= ρ, there is no solution to this equation, so f ′
(
k¯
)
must be equal
to ρ. In order to establish (41), we differentiate twice the (DE) equation (which
is here the HJB equation) and evaluate it at k¯ and get
−V ′(k¯)f ′′(k¯) = u′′(c¯)α
(
f ′(k¯)− α
)
.
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This is a quadratic equation in α and, assuming f is concave, it admits two
roots,
α = f ′(k¯)

1±
√
1 + 4u
′(k¯)f ′′(k¯)
ρ2u′′(k¯)
2


The second root is not valid because k¯ is an attractor and hence 0 < f ′(k¯) ≤ α.
This leave us with the only possible root α given by (41). Q.E.D.
F Proof of Proposition 11
Substituting the specification of the discount function into equation (39) gives
1 = α
∫ T
0
exp
[(
−ρ+ f ′
(
k¯
)
− α
)
t
]
dt (58)
Since α ≥ f ′
(
k¯
)
, the term ρ − f ′
(
k¯
)
+ α is different from 0 and therefore
the equation (58) becomes(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− ρ
)
T exp
[
−T
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− ρ
)]
= αT exp (−αT ) (59)
The left inequality of (42) is simply obtained by noticing that, due to
equation (58), α must be positive and the equation (59) implies then that
f ′
(
k¯
)
− ρ > 0.
Now notice that equation (59) is of the type xex = yey. It has the obvious
solution x = y, plus another one. The first solution gives f ′
(
k¯
)
− ρ = α,
contradicting the fact that ρ − f ′
(
k¯
)
+ α 6= 0, so it must be rejected. The
second solution defines y as a function of x, say y = ϕ (x) for x > 0, which
is easily seen to be decreasing and to obey the properties given in (??). So
αT = ϕ
(
T
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
− ρ
))
, and formula (43) follows.
Now, taking into account the condition α ≥ f ′
(
k¯
)
given by (38), equation
(43) implies
ϕ
(
f ′
(
k¯
)
T − ρT
)
≥ f ′
(
k¯
)
T > f ′
(
k¯
)
T − ρT.
Since the function ϕ is decreasing and ϕ(1) = 1, the above inequality implies
f ′
(
k¯
)
T − ρT < 1
which is precisely the right inequality of of (42).
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